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Footnotes
1. See M. Jackson, Locking Up Natives in Canada, 23 U.B.C. L. REV.
215  (1988-89).
2. See An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sentencing) and other Acts
in consequence thereof, S.C. 1995, c. 22.
3. Alexandra Hebert, in Change in Paradigm or Change in Paradox?
Gladue Report Practices and Access to Justice, 43:1 QUEEN’S L.J. 149
(2017), described the enactment of section 718.2(e) of the Crimi-
nal Code as a “fundamental paradigm change in the framework for
sentencing Indigenous offenders” (at paragraph 4).
Canada’s Indigenous population has been overrepresentedin Canada’s prison population for a considerable periodof time. In the mid-1980s, for instance, aboriginal peo-
ple made up approximately two percent of the population of
Canada but made up ten percent of the penitentiary popula-
tion.1
On September 3, 1996, the Parliament of Canada enacted a
number of amendments to the Criminal Code of Canada,
R.S.C., 1985.2 One of these was in response to the level of
incarceration of Indigenous people: section 718.2(e). This pro-
vision deals with the sentencing of “aboriginal offenders.” It
states as follows:
A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into
consideration the following principles:
(e) all available sanctions other than imprisonment
that are reasonable in the circumstances should be
considered for all offenders, with particular atten-
tion to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders.3
In this quarter’s column I will review three Supreme Court
of Canada decisions, which have considered this provision and
the manner in which those decisions have been subsequently
applied by other courts. As will be seen, the application of this
provision has raised a number of questions concerning the
sentencing of Indigenous Canadians.
The Supreme Court of Canada’s initial consideration of this
section came in R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688.
R. v. GLADUE
In Gladue, an Indigenous offender was convicted of the
offence of manslaughter. She had stabbed and killed her
boyfriend. She was sentenced to a period of three years of
imprisonment. The sentence was affirmed by the British
Columbia Court of Appeal.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court indi-
cated that the “issue in this appeal is the proper interpretation
and application to be given to s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code”
(at paragraph 24).
The Supreme Court commenced its analysis by suggesting
that section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code was “more than sim-
ply a re-affirmation of existing sentencing principles. The
remedial component of the provision consists not only in the
fact that it codifies a principle of sentencing, but, far more
importantly, in its direction to sentencing judges to undertake
the process of sentencing aboriginal offenders differently” (at
paragraph 33).
The Supreme Court of Canada held that section 718.2(e) of
the Criminal Code mandates a different approach to sentencing
those of aboriginal heritage. The Court indicated that the
“background considerations regarding the distinct situation of
aboriginal peoples in Canada encompass a wide range of
unique circumstances, including, most particularly” (at para-
graph 66):
(A) The unique systemic or background factors which
may have played a part in bringing the particular abo-
riginal offender before the courts; and
(B) The types of sentencing procedures and sanctions
which may be appropriate in the circumstances for the
offender because of his or her particular aboriginal her-
itage or connection. 
(a) Systemic and Background Factors:
Under this heading, the Supreme Court indicated in Gladue
that “it must be recognized that the circumstances of aborigi-
nal offenders differ from those of the majority because many
aboriginal people are victims of systemic and direct discrimi-
nation, many suffer the legacy of dislocation, and many are
substantially affected by poor social and economic conditions”
(at paragraph 68).
(b) Appropriate Sentencing Procedures and Sanctions:
Under this heading, the Supreme Court indicated in Gladue
that it “is important to recognize” that “for many if not most
aboriginal offenders, the current concepts of sentencing are
inappropriate because they have frequently not responded to
the needs, experiences, and perspectives of aboriginal people
or aboriginal communities” (at paragraph 73). The Court also
indicated that “one of the unique circumstances of aboriginal
offenders is that community-based sanctions coincide with the
aboriginal concept of sentencing and the needs of aboriginal
people and communities. It is often the case that neither abo-
riginal offenders nor their communities are well served by
incarcerating offenders, particularly for less serious or non-vio-
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4. Section 742.1 of the Criminal Code allows a sentencing judge to
impose a period of imprisonment and to order that it be served in
the community subject to certain conditions. It states as follows:
If a person is convicted of an offence and the court imposes
a sentence of imprisonment of less than two years, the court
may, for the purpose of supervising the offender’s behaviour in
the community, order that the offender serve the sentence in
the community, subject to the conditions imposed under sec-
tion 742.3.
lent offences. Where these sanctions are reasonable in the cir-
cumstances, they should be implemented. In all instances, it is
appropriate to attempt to craft the sentencing process and the
sanctions imposed in accordance with the aboriginal perspec-
tive” (at paragraph 74).
THE DUTY OF THE SENTENCING JUDGE
The Supreme Court also commented on the “duty of the
sentencing judge” when imposing sentence upon an aborigi-
nal offender. The Court held that there “is no discretion as to
whether to consider the unique situation of the aboriginal
offender; the only discretion concerns the determination of a
just and appropriate sentence” (at paragraph 82). In addition,
it held that sentencing judges must “take judicial notice of
the systemic or background factors and the approach to sen-
tencing which is relevant to aboriginal offenders” (at para-
graph 83). The Court mandated an interventionist judicial
approach by requiring the sentencing judge “to attempt to
acquire information regarding the circumstances of the
offender as an aboriginal person. . . . Beyond the use of the
pre-sentence report, the sentencing judge may and should in
appropriate circumstances and where practicable request that
witnesses be called who may testify as to reasonable alterna-
tives” (at paragraph 84).
A BACKING AWAY?
Having said all of this, at the end of its decision in Gladue
the Supreme Court appears to have backed away from some of
its earlier comments. The Court indicated, for instance, that it
was not suggesting that “aboriginal offenders must always be
sentenced in a manner which gives greatest weight to the prin-
ciples of restorative justice, and less weight to goals such as
deterrence, denunciation, and separation” (at paragraphs 78).
In addition, the Court stated that section 718.2(e) “should not
be taken as requiring an automatic reduction of a sentence, or
a remission of a warranted period of incarceration, simply
because the offender is aboriginal” (at paragraph 88). Finally,
it indicated “the more violent and serious the offence the more
likely it is as a practical reality that the terms of imprisonment
for aboriginals and non-aboriginals will be close to each other
or the same, even taking into account their different concepts
of sentencing” (at paragraph 79). 
In summary, the Supreme Court suggested in Gladue that
Indigenous offenders must be sentenced individually, but in a
different fashion than non-indigenous offenders. The Court
indicated that “the jail term for an aboriginal offender may in
some circumstances be less than the term imposed on a non-
aboriginal offender for the same offence,” but not “necessarily”
(at paragraph 95). The Court also held, however, that for vio-
lent or serious offences, Indigenous offenders will likely
receive the same sentence as non-indigenous offenders. 
So then, what real effect does
section 718.2(e) have? This dif-
ficult question lies at the core of
how Indigenous offenders
should be sentenced in Canada.
GLADUE CONCLUSION:
The Supreme Court con-
cluded that the sentencing judge
and the Court of Appeal had
erred in failing to consider “the
systemic or background factors
which may have influenced the appellant to engage in criminal
conduct” (at paragraph 94). The Court indicated that normally
this would result in remitting the matter to the sentencing
judge for reconsideration. However, by the time the Supreme
Court had rendered its decision, the offender had been released
on parole. As a result the Court decided not to remit the mat-
ter to the sentencing judge and dismissed the appeal.
Four years would pass before the Supreme Court consid-
ered the sentencing of Indigenous offenders again. This time,
in R. v. Wells, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 207. 
R. v. WELLS
In Wells, an Indigenous offender was convicted of the
offence of sexual assault. He was sentenced to a period of
twenty months of incarceration. He appealed seeking to have a
“conditional period of imprisonment” substituted for the
period of incarceration imposed.4 The Alberta Court of Appeal
dismissed his appeal.
The Supreme Court of Canada indicated that the appeal
required it “to consider the conditional sentencing provisions
of the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, in the context of
aboriginal offenders.”
The Supreme Court suggested in Wells that section 718.2(e)
“was intended to address the serious problem of overincarcer-
ation of aboriginal offenders in Canadian penal institutions.”
In very broad terms, the Court indicated that “Parliament
intended to address this social problem, to the extent that a
remedy was possible through sentencing procedures.” The
Court indicated that “given that most traditional aboriginal
approaches place a primary emphasis on the goal of restorative
justice, the alternative of community-based sanctions must be
explored” for Indigenous offenders (at paragraphs 37 and 38).
However, despite this broad language the Supreme Court
returned to the qualified approach it had explained in Gladue
concerning the commission of “violent or serious” offences.
The Court held in Wells, at paragraph 42, that “the more vio-
lent and serious the offence, the more likely as a practical mat-
ter that the appropriate sentence will not differ as between abo-
riginal and non-aboriginal offenders, given that in these cir-
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“Indigenous
offenders must
be sentenced
individually, but
in a different
fashion than 
non-indigenous
offenders”
5. Section 753.1 of the Criminal Code allows for an offender to be
declared a “long-term offender.” If such a declaration is made, the
sentencing judge can impose conditions. A breach of these condi-
tions constitutes an offence. Section 753.1(1) states as follows:
753.1(1) The court may, on application made under this
Part following the filing of an assessment report under sub-
section 752.1(2), find an offender to be a long-term
offender if it is satisfied that
(a) it would be appropriate to impose a sentence of
imprisonment of two years or more for the offence
for which the offender has been convicted;
(b) there is a substantial risk that the offender will
reoffend; and
(c) there is a reasonable possibility of eventual con-
trol of the risk in the community.
cumstances, the goals of denuncia-
tion and deterrence are accorded
increasing significance.” In addi-
tion, the Court also held in Wells
that section 718.2(e) “requires a
different methodology for assessing
a fit sentence for an aboriginal
offender; it does not mandate, nec-
essarily, a different result” (at para-
graph 44). 
What is a sentencing judge to
make of these words? A different
approach, but the same result might suggest that the enact-
ment of section 718.2(e) was meaningless.
THE SENTENCING JUDGE’S DUTY
The Supreme Court returned to this issue in Wells and this
time indicated that section 718.2(e) “places an affirmative
obligation upon the sentencing judge to inquire into the rele-
vant circumstances. In most cases, the requirement of special
attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders can be
satisfied by the information contained in pre-sentence reports.
Where this information is insufficient, s. 718.2(e) authorizes
the sentencing judge on his or her own initiative to request
that witnesses be called to testify as to reasonable alternatives
to a custodial sentence” (at paragraph 54).
Once again, the Supreme Court mandated a very interven-
tionist judicial approach to sentencing. An approach which is
very different from the approach traditionally adopted by
Canadian judges. However, at the very end of its decision in
Wells, the Court stated that it “was never the Court’s intention,
in setting out the appropriate methodology for this assessment,
to transform the role of the sentencing judge into that of a
board of inquiry” (at paragraph 55).
WELLS CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court concluded in Wells that the trial judge
did not err in declining to impose a conditional period of
imprisonment. It held that “it was open to the trial judge to
give primacy to the principles of denunciation and deterrence
in this case on the basis that the crime involved was a serious
one” (at paragraph 44).
The Supreme Court would return to the sentencing of
Indigenous offenders twelve years later. This time in R. v.
Ipeelee, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433, in which it suggested that numer-
ous courts had “erroneously interpreted” its decisions in Wells
and Gladue (at paragraph 84).
R. v. IPEELEE
In Ipeelee, the Supreme Court considered appeals involving
two Indigenous offenders (Mr. Ipeelee and Mr. Ladue) in rela-
tion to the sentences imposed for breaches of long-term super-
vision orders (LTSO).5
Mr. Ipeelee had been declared to be a long-term offender. He
was the subject of conditions for a period of seven years. He
breached the LTSO by consuming alcohol. He was sentenced
to a period of three years of incarceration.
Mr. Ladue had also been declared to be a long-term
offender. He was the subject of conditions for a period of ten
years. He breached his LTSO by taking drugs. He was sen-
tenced to a period of one year of incarceration. 
The Supreme Court indicated that the “central issue in
these appeals is how to determine a fit sentence for a breach of
an LTSO in the case of an Aboriginal offender. In particular, the
Court must address whether, and how, the Gladue principles
apply to these sentencing decisions” (at paragraph 34).
The Supreme Court repeated its comments in Gladue in
which it described section 718.2(e) as being “remedial” in
nature. It pointed out that though Gladue had been decided
over a decade ago; it and section 718.2(e) have “not had a dis-
cernible impact on the overrepresentation of Aboriginal peo-
ple in the criminal justice system.” The Court concluded that
this “can be attributed to some extent to a fundamental mis-
understanding and misapplication of both s. 718.2(e) and this
Court’s decision in Gladue.” The Supreme Court indicated
that it was taking the opportunity offered by Ipeelee “to
resolve these misunderstandings, clarify certain ambiguities,
and provide additional guidance so that courts can properly
implement this sentencing provision” (at paragraph 63). Did
it do so?
JUDICIAL NOTICE
The Court commenced with stressing the importance of
judicial notice in the sentencing of Indigenous offenders. The
Court held in Ipeelee that sentencing courts “must take judicial
notice of such matters as the history of colonialism, displace-
ment, and residential schools and how that history continues
to translate into lower educational attainment, lower incomes,
higher unemployment, higher rates of substance abuse and
suicide, and of course higher levels of incarceration for Abo-
riginal peoples” (at paragraph 60). 
A CAUSAL LINK?
The Court rejected the proposition that an Indigenous
offender need “establish a causal link between background fac-
tors and the commission of the current offence before being
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appeals is how
to determine 
a fit sentence 
… of an 
Aboriginal
offender’”
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entitled to have those matters considered by the sentencing
judge” (at paragraph 81). However, the Court went on to say
that “[u]nless the unique circumstances of the particular
offender bear on his or her culpability for the offence or indicate
which sentencing objectives can and should be actualized, they
will not influence the ultimate sentence” (at paragraph 83).
SERIOUS OR VIOLENT OFFENCES
In Ipeelee, the Court returned to its comments in Gladue
concerning serious or violent offences. The Court stated that a
failure to apply Gladue “in any case involving an Aboriginal
offender runs afoul of this statutory obligation. . . . Therefore,
application of the Gladue principles is required in every case
involving an Aboriginal offender” (at paragraph 87).
IPEELEE CONCLUSION
The majority of the Court concluded that the sentence
imposed on Mr. Ipeelee should be reduced to a period of one
year of imprisonment. It concluded that the sentence imposed
upon Mr. Ladue should be affirmed. 
THE DISSENT
Ipeelee contained the first Supreme Court dissent in relation
to the interpretation of section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code.
It is illustrative of the tensions caused by Gladue.
Mr. Justice Rothstein indicated that Aboriginal communi-
ties “are not a separate category entitled to less protection
because the offender is Aboriginal. Where the breach of an
LTSO goes to the control of the Aboriginal offender in the
community, rehabilitation and reintegration into society will
have faltered, if not failed” (at paragraphs 130 and 131). 
Mr. Justice Rothstein would have affirmed the three-year
sentence imposed upon Mr. Ipeelee and the one-year sentence
imposed upon Mr. Ladue.
A SUMMARY
In summary, over the course of these three judgments the
Supreme Court of Canada has attempted to formulate a
national approach to the sentencing of Indigenous offenders.
The decisions contain some bold and general statements, but
there is also some hedging of these comments by reference to
a lack of intent to create a race-based sentencing process and
the end result being the same for Indigenous and non-indige-
nous offenders when a serious or violent crime has been com-
6. An example of how far this can be taken can be found in R. v.
Bennett, 2017 NLCA 41. In Bennett, the offender indicated at his
sentence hearing that he was “native and a member of the local
Qalipu band.” Nothing else was referred to. On appeal from the
sentence imposed, the Court of Appeal concluded that the sen-
tencing judge “erred in principle by failing to obtain a waiver or
to turn her mind to the application of section 718.2(e) of the
Code when determining an appropriate sentence. While Mr.
Bennett did not elaborate regarding his statement that he was a
member of the local Qalipu band, it was incumbent on the judge
to address the issue because it had been raised” (at paragraph
26). 
7. One author has referred to Ipeelee as a “major step forward” (see
Jonathan Rudin, Looking Backward, Looking Forward: The Supreme
Court of Canada’s Decision in R. v. Ipeelee, (2012), 57 S.C.L.R.
(2d) 375, at paragraph 18):
There is no question that Ipeelee is more than just a
strong re-statement of Gladue. For those concerned with
increasing levels of Aboriginal over-representation over time
— to the point where now approximately one-quarter of
inmates in custody in Canada are Aboriginal, Ipeelee is a
major step forward. In its clarification of some of the confu-
sion that arose following Gladue, and in its repudiation of
those academics and judges who have sought to minimize
or trivialize that decision, the Court has made clear that
addressing Aboriginal over-representation is properly the
responsibility of all those in the justice system.
mitted. Thus, Indigenous
offenders are to be sentenced dif-
ferently, but how exactly? 
Having said this, the Supreme
Court’s three decisions contain a
number of consistent themes.
The Court has consistently char-
acterized section 718.2(e) of the
Criminal Code as being “reme-
dial” in nature and thus consti-
tuting a new approach to the sentencing of Indigenous offend-
ers. The Court has consistently held that it is mandatory that
judges take judicial notice of the history and present social eco-
nomic plight of Indigenous Canadians. It has consistently
directed judges to seek out background information on their
own initiative when counsel have failed to present such evi-
dence.6
These themes continue to be judicially debated in Canada.
Let us now turn to how the interpretation of section 718.2(e)
has unfolded since Ipeelee.7
GLADUE REPORTS
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court referred to the neces-
sity of evidence being presented at the sentence hearing con-
cerning the offender’s Indigenous background. These reports
have come to be known as “Gladue Reports.” In R. v. Macintyre-
Syrette, 2018 ONCA 259, the nature and importance of such
reports was commented upon in the following manner (at
paragraph 14):
The Gladue factors are highly particular to the indi-
vidual offender, and so require that the sentencing judge
be given adequate resources to understand the life of the
particular offender. But that is not all. A second enquiry
is required by Gladue, assessing available sentencing pro-
cedures and sanctions, requires an understanding of
available alternatives to ordinary sentencing procedures
and sanctions. In particular, if, as in this case, the
offender lives as a member of a discrete Indigenous com-
munity, the sentencing judge needs to be told what insti-
tutions exist within that community and whether there
are specific proposals from community leadership or
organizations for alternative sentencing to promote the
reconciliation of the offender to his or her community: 
“the Supreme
Court’s three
decisions contain
a number of 
consistent
themes”
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8. Interestingly, legislation has been presented in Parliament to
require an offender’s aboriginal status to be considered in bail
hearings. In An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, the Youth Crimi-
nal Justice Act and other Acts and to make consequential amendments
to other Acts, Bill C-75, the bail provisions in the Criminal Code
would be amended to require that judges “pay particular attention
to circumstances of Aboriginal accused and accused who belong
to other vulnerable populations overrepresented in the criminal
justice system and disadvantaged in obtaining release.”
DOES SECTION 718.2(E) REQUIRE MORE THAN AN
INDIGENOUS BACKGROUND TO APPLY?
One of the issues raised in Gladue was what is an “aborigi-
nal offender” for the purpose of section 718.2(e) of the Crimi-
nal Code? In Gladue, the Supreme Court indicated that the
“class of aboriginal people who come within the purview of the
specific reference to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders
in s. 718.2(e) must be, at least, all who come within the scope
of s. 25 of the Charter and s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982”
(at paragraph 90). However, is this sufficient? 
In R. v. Lavergne, 2017 ONCA 642, the offender was
described as being “Indigenous.” However, the Ontario Court
of Appeal noted that “the record does not disclose anything
else beyond his statement of his Indigenous heritage. There is
no evidence of any systemic or background factors which may
have played a part in bringing this accused before the court.”
The Court of Appeal held that a “bare assertion of Indigenous
heritage, without more, would not have had any impact on the
sentence imposed” (at paragraph 33). The British Columbia
Court of Appeal used similar language in R. v. Fontaine, 2014
BCCA 1: “there was no suggestion or evidence in this case that
there have been any ‘systemic background factors’ that might
‘bear on the culpability’ of the offender” (at paragraph 33). But
how can these types of comments coexist with the Supreme
Court’s requirement that sentencing judges take judicial notice
of the systematic background factors which apply to all Indige-
nous peoples? 
In R. v. Violette, [2013] B.C.J. No. 110 (C.A.), the offender
was sentenced to a period of six years imprisonment for the
commission of a number of offences. On appeal from sentence
he sought to introduce fresh evidence “revealing his Aboriginal
heritage, which was not known to him at the time of sentenc-
ing” (see paragraph 4). The British Columbia Court of Appeal
dismissed the application to introduce this evidence because it
could not have affected the result. The Court of Appeal
pointed out that the evidence did not establish a “connection
between” the offender’s Aboriginal heritage and “his culpability,
or anything to suggest the sentencing objectives should be
influenced by this newly discovered factor” (at paragraph 8):
In this case, the appellant does not assert any personal
background, or any systemic factors, that bear upon his
appearance as an accused person. There is no material
before the court which would suggest he has suffered
deprivation because of Aboriginal heritage, nor is there
connection between this circumstance and his culpabil-
ity, or anything to suggest the sentencing objectives
should be influenced by this newly discovered factor. It
simply cannot be said, in my view, that the evidence
sought to be adduced could have a bearing upon the sen-
tence imposed for these offences. Accordingly, I would
dismiss the application to adduce new evidence.
Gladue, at para. 84; R. v. Lalib-
erte, 2000 SKCA 27 (CanLII), at
para. 59. The ordinary source of
this information is the Gladue
report.
In Macintyre-Syrette, the Court
of Appeal concluded that it “was
an error” for the sentencing judge
“to have proceeded with sentenc-
ing on the strength of the materi-
als before him. The Gladue report
gave insufficient assistance to the
sentencing judge with respect to
the second aspect of the Gladue analysis: of determining the
types of sentencing procedures and sanctions that would be
appropriate given the offender’s connection to his specific Abo-
riginal community” (at paragraph 19).
DO THE GLADUE PRINCIPLES APPLY OUTSIDE OF THE
IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE?
How far can Gladue be extended? An unsuccessful attempt
to extend Gladue well beyond the imposition of sentencing can
be found in R. v. Anderson, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 167.
In Anderson, an Indigenous offender was convicted of a
drinking and driving offence. He had prior convictions for
such an offence. The Criminal Code requires that in such a sit-
uation that minimum prescribed periods of incarceration must
be imposed, depending on the number of prior convictions.
However, for this mandatory minimum sentencing scheme to
be activated, the Crown must serve the offender with a notice
that it will be seeking this penalty. In this case, the Crown
served Mr. Anderson with the appropriate notice.
Mr. Anderson argued that before serving such a notice the
Crown was obliged to consider the offender’s Indigenous sta-
tus and that the Crown had not done so in his case. This argu-
ment was accepted by the trial judge and the Court of Appeal
for Newfoundland and Labrador. However, it was rejected by
the Supreme Court of Canada. The Supreme Court held that
“there is no principle of fundamental justice that supports the
existence of such a constitutional obligation” and thus “Crown
prosecutors are under no constitutional duty to consider the
accused’s Aboriginal status when tendering the Notice” (at
paragraphs 1 and 5). 
Though the appeal to the Supreme Court in Anderson did
not directly involve the issue of the sentencing of Indigenous
offenders, the Court made some comments on this issue. It
indicated that the “failure of a sentencing judge to consider the
unique circumstances of Aboriginal offenders . . . breaches
both the judge’s statutory obligations, under ss. 718.1 and
718.2 of the Code, and the principle of fundamental justice that
sentences be proportionate” (at paragraph 24).8
“the evidence
did not establish
a ‘connection
between’ the
offender’s 
Aboriginal 
heritage and
‘his culpability’”
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Thus, it appears that the Court of Appeal is saying that if an
offender is Indigenous, a Canadian judge must consider this
factor in determining an appropriate sentence, but it will be
insignificant unless there is a connection between the
offender’s Indigenous heritage and the offence. This sounds
like requiring a causal connection. So then, when will an
offender’s Indigenous background result in a lesser sentence
being imposed?
WHEN THEN WILL AN OFFENDER’S INDIGENOUS
BACKGROUND RESULT IN A LESSER SENTENCE?
In R. v. F.L., 2018 ONCA 83, [2018] O.J. No. 482, the
Ontario Court of Appeal asked the ultimate question: “In what
circumstances, then, will an offender’s Aboriginal background
influence their ultimate sentence?” The Court of Appeal indi-
cated that the answer is not “easily ascertained or articulated”
(at paragraph 38). 
The Court of Appeal stated that “the mere assertion of one’s
Aboriginal heritage is insufficient” and that “more is required
‘than the bare assertion of an offender’s Aboriginal status.’” The
Court of Appeal also indicated that it is “insufficient for an
Aboriginal offender to point to the systemic and background
factors affecting Aboriginal people in Canadian society. While
courts are obliged to take judicial notice of those factors, they
do not “necessarily justify a different sentence for Aboriginal
offenders. Rather, they provide the necessary context for
understanding and evaluating the case-specific information
presented by counsel” (at paragraphs 38 and 39). 
The Court of Appeal concluded in F.L., that the correct
approach may be articulated as follows: (at paragraph 40):
For an offender’s Aboriginal background to influence
his or her ultimate sentence, the systemic and back-
ground factors affecting Aboriginal people in Canadian
society must have impacted the offender’s life in a way
that (1) bears on moral blameworthiness, or (2) indi-
cates which types of sentencing objectives should be pri-
oritized in the offender’s case. This approach finds sup-
port both in Ipeelee and decisions of this court.
As a result, the Court of Appeal held that sentencing judges
“must take judicial notice of the systemic and background fac-
tors affecting Aboriginal peoples in Canadian society” and then
consider whether those “factors have impacted the offender’s
own life experiences — in other words, whether the offender
has ‘lift[ed] his life circumstances and Aboriginal status from
the general to the specific’...If systemic and background factors
have impacted an Aboriginal offender’s own life experiences,
the sentencing judge must then consider whether they ‘illumi-
nate the offender’s level of moral blameworthiness” or disclose
the sentencing objectives that should be prioritized’” (at para-
graphs 44 and 45).
This approach is similar to the approach adopted in relation
to all offenders in Canada in the sense that a Canadian sentenc-
ing judge must impose a proportionate sentence based upon the
offence and the offender’s degree of moral responsibility for the
offence (see R. v. Levesque, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 487, at paragraph 18
and R. v. C.A.M., [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, at paragraph 56). The only
difference suggested by the reasoning utilized in F.L. involves the
requirement for the sentencing
judge, without the requirement of
evidence, to accept the existence
of there being systemic and back-
ground factors that have nega-
tively affected Indigenous people
in Canada. This interpretation
would appear to effectively render
section 718.2(e) meaningless
despite the Supreme Court com-
ments concerning its importance. 
Interestingly, R. v. Boutilier,
[2017] 2 S.C.R. 936, the Supreme
Court held that “through s.
718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, Parliament has directed sen-
tencing judges to pay particular attention to the circumstances
of Indigenous offenders. This recognizes that the systemic dis-
advantages and marginalization faced by Indigenous people
inform moral blameworthiness and therefore the proportional-
ity of sentences for Indigenous offenders” (at paragraph 108). 
CONCLUSION
It is clear that in Canada, “sentencing judges are required to
consider the Gladue principles in every case involving the sen-
tencing of an Indigenous offender” (see R. v. Sanderson, 2018
MBCA 63, at paragraph 10). 
Gladue continues to be the source of significant appellate
court commentary. For instance, in R. v. Skookum, 2018 YKCA
2, it was indicated that section 718.2(e) “recognizes that the
devastating intergenerational effects of the collective experi-
ence of First Nations peoples may shape the way in which
expression is given to the fundamental purposes and principles
of sentencing” (at paragraph 98). However, in R. v. Holloway,
[2014] A.J. No. 217 (C.A.), it was held that “nothing in s.
718.2(e) of the Code suggests that there should be a discount
from a proportional sentence automatically because the
offender is an aboriginal person” (at paragraph 42). In con-
trast, in R. v. Sellars, 2018 BCCA 195, the British Columbia
Court of Appeal held that a “disparity between sentences for
Aboriginal offenders and other offenders can be justified where
there are circumstances unique to the Aboriginal offender,
even when considering the principle of parity as codified in s.
718.2(b) that a sentence should be similar to sentences
imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in
similar circumstances” (at paragraph 31).
In R. v. Anderson, 2018 MBCA 42, the Manitoba Court of
Appeal held that “sentencing judges have the legal duty in
every case involving an Indigenous offender to alter their
method of analysis in the assessment of moral culpability in
order to achieve a truly fit and proper sentence in terms of the
circumstances of the offence, the offender, the victim and the
wider community. . . . There is no discretion to ignore this legal
duty even in cases where the offence is serious (see Gladue at
para 82; and Ipeelee at para 87). The failure of a sentencing
judge to fully engage in their legal duty is an error in principle
justifying appellate intervention” (at paragraph 57).
In R. v. Giroux, 2018 ABCA 56, an Indigenous offender was
convicted of the offence of possession of cocaine for the pur-
pose of trafficking and sentenced to a period of ninety days of
“the devastating
intergenerational
effects of the 
collective 
experience of
First Nations
people may
shape … 
sentencing”
9. See “Pathways to Justice–Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples” (Australian Law
Reform Commission, Report 133, March 28, 2018), which made
the following recommendation (Recommendation 6.1):
Sentencing legislation should provide that, when sentenc-
ing Aboriginal . . . offenders, courts take into account unique
systemic and background factors affecting Aboriginal . . . peo-
ples.
imprisonment. On appeal, the Albert Court of Appeal indi-
cated that the “starting point” for the offence was a period of
three years of imprisonment, but only increased the sentence
imposed to one of nine months of imprisonment. In doing so,
the Court of Appeal indicated that it was applying “the miti-
gating effect of the guilty plea, her lack of criminal record, an
absence of financial incentive, her work and family life, and
the influence of Gladue factors in her life” (at paragraph 31).
Thus, the offender’s Indigenous heritage was a factor in the
Court of Appeal imposing a sentence which was lower than
normal. However, it is difficult from the Court’s comments to
ascertain what impact the offender’s Indigenous heritage had
upon the sentence imposed. 
In Australia, the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders has also
been an issue of significant debate.9 The Australia High Court
has adopted a much different approach than the one adopted
by the Supreme Court of Canada.
In Bugmy v. The Queen [2013] HCA 37, the High Court of
Australia considered the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions
in Gladue and Ipeelee. The High Court distinguished Gladue
based upon the wording of the Criminal Code of Canada being
different than the applicable Australian legislation (see section
5(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW)). In
addition, however, the High Court also refused to adopt the
Gladue sentencing approach on the basis that it would result in
the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders ceasing “to involve indi-
vidualised justice” (at paragraph 36):
…There is no warrant, in sentencing an Aboriginal
offender in New South Wales, to apply a method of
analysis different from that which applies in sentencing
a non-Aboriginal offender. Nor is there a warrant to take
into account the high rate of incarceration of Aboriginal
people when sentencing an Aboriginal offender. Were
this a consideration, the sentencing of Aboriginal offend-
ers would cease to involve individualised justice.
In conclusion, it has been over twenty years since section
718.2(e) has been added to Canada’s Criminal Code and its
application remains a challenge for sentencing judges. The sec-
tion requires a broad application of judicial notice and an
interventionist approach, but determining its practical effect
on the sentence imposed is still far from certain. Though the
Supreme Court of Canada has rejected the requirement for a
“causal link” some recent appellate court decisions appear to
be applying such an approach. 
Wayne Gorman is a judge of the Provincial
Court of Newfoundland and Labrador. His
blog (Keeping Up Is Hard to Do: A Trial
Judge’s Reading Blog) can be found on the web
page of the Canadian Association of Provincial
Court Judges. He also writes a regular col-
umn (Of Particular Interest to Provincial
Court Judges) for the Canadian Provincial
Judges’ Journal. Judge Gorman’s work has been widely published.
Comments or suggestions to Judge Gorman may be sent to 
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The American Judges Association (AJA) conducted interviews about procedural 
fairness with nine national leaders on issues involving judges and the courts. The 
interviews, done by Kansas Court of Appeals Judge and past AJA president Steve
Leben, cover the elements of procedural fairness for courts and judges, how judges
can improve fairness skills, and how the public reacts to courts and judges. The
interviews were done in August 2014; job titles are shown as of the date of the 
interviews.
Visit http://proceduralfairnessguide.org/interviews/ to watch the interviews.
AMERICAN JUDGES ASSOCIATION:
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS INTERVIEWS
